| 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 3 | * Copyright (c) 2018-2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| 6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| 9 | */ |
| 10 | |
| 11 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
| 12 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| 13 | #include "crypto/bn.h" |
| 14 | #include "rsa_local.h" |
| 15 | |
| 16 | #define RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_KEYSIZE 2048 |
| 17 | #define RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_STRENGTH 112 |
| 18 | #define RSA_FIPS1864_MAX_KEYGEN_STRENGTH 256 |
| 19 | |
| 20 | /* |
| 21 | * Generate probable primes 'p' & 'q'. See FIPS 186-4 Section B.3.6 |
| 22 | * "Generation of Probable Primes with Conditions Based on Auxiliary Probable |
| 23 | * Primes". |
| 24 | * |
| 25 | * Params: |
| 26 | * rsa Object used to store primes p & q. |
| 27 | * p1, p2 The returned auxiliary primes for p. If NULL they are not returned. |
| 28 | * Xpout An optionally returned random number used during generation of p. |
| 29 | * Xp An optional passed in value (that is random number used during |
| 30 | * generation of p). |
| 31 | * Xp1, Xp2 Optionally passed in randomly generated numbers from which |
| 32 | * auxiliary primes p1 & p2 are calculated. If NULL these values |
| 33 | * are generated internally. |
| 34 | * q1, q2 The returned auxiliary primes for q. If NULL they are not returned. |
| 35 | * Xqout An optionally returned random number used during generation of q. |
| 36 | * Xq An optional passed in value (that is random number used during |
| 37 | * generation of q). |
| 38 | * Xq1, Xq2 Optionally passed in randomly generated numbers from which |
| 39 | * auxiliary primes q1 & q2 are calculated. If NULL these values |
| 40 | * are generated internally. |
| 41 | * nbits The key size in bits (The size of the modulus n). |
| 42 | * e The public exponent. |
| 43 | * ctx A BN_CTX object. |
| 44 | * cb An optional BIGNUM callback. |
| 45 | * Returns: 1 if successful, or 0 otherwise. |
| 46 | * Notes: |
| 47 | * p1, p2, q1, q2, Xpout, Xqout are returned if they are not NULL. |
| 48 | * Xp, Xp1, Xp2, Xq, Xq1, Xq2 are optionally passed in. |
| 49 | * (Required for CAVS testing). |
| 50 | */ |
| 51 | int rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, |
| 52 | BIGNUM *Xpout, const BIGNUM *Xp, |
| 53 | const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2, |
| 54 | BIGNUM *q1, BIGNUM *q2, BIGNUM *Xqout, |
| 55 | const BIGNUM *Xq, const BIGNUM *Xq1, |
| 56 | const BIGNUM *Xq2, int nbits, |
| 57 | const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) |
| 58 | { |
| 59 | int ret = 0, ok; |
| 60 | BIGNUM *Xpo = NULL, *Xqo = NULL, *tmp = NULL; |
| 61 | |
| 62 | /* (Step 1) Check key length |
| 63 | * NOTE: SP800-131A Rev1 Disallows key lengths of < 2048 bits for RSA |
| 64 | * Signature Generation and Key Agree/Transport. |
| 65 | */ |
| 66 | if (nbits < RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_KEYSIZE) { |
| 67 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_FIPS186_4_GEN_PROB_PRIMES, RSA_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| 68 | return 0; |
| 69 | } |
| 70 | |
| 71 | if (!rsa_check_public_exponent(e)) { |
| 72 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_FIPS186_4_GEN_PROB_PRIMES, |
| 73 | RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); |
| 74 | return 0; |
| 75 | } |
| 76 | |
| 77 | /* (Step 3) Determine strength and check rand generator strength is ok - |
| 78 | * this step is redundant because the generator always returns a higher |
| 79 | * strength than is required. |
| 80 | */ |
| 81 | |
| 82 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 83 | tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 84 | Xpo = (Xpout != NULL) ? Xpout : BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 85 | Xqo = (Xqout != NULL) ? Xqout : BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 86 | if (tmp == NULL || Xpo == NULL || Xqo == NULL) |
| 87 | goto err; |
| 88 | |
| 89 | if (rsa->p == NULL) |
| 90 | rsa->p = BN_secure_new(); |
| 91 | if (rsa->q == NULL) |
| 92 | rsa->q = BN_secure_new(); |
| 93 | if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL) |
| 94 | goto err; |
| 95 | |
| 96 | /* (Step 4) Generate p, Xp */ |
| 97 | if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa->p, Xpo, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2, |
| 98 | nbits, e, ctx, cb)) |
| 99 | goto err; |
| 100 | for(;;) { |
| 101 | /* (Step 5) Generate q, Xq*/ |
| 102 | if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa->q, Xqo, q1, q2, Xq, Xq1, |
| 103 | Xq2, nbits, e, ctx, cb)) |
| 104 | goto err; |
| 105 | |
| 106 | /* (Step 6) |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbitlen/2 - 100) */ |
| 107 | ok = rsa_check_pminusq_diff(tmp, Xpo, Xqo, nbits); |
| 108 | if (ok < 0) |
| 109 | goto err; |
| 110 | if (ok == 0) |
| 111 | continue; |
| 112 | |
| 113 | /* (Step 6) |p - q| > 2^(nbitlen/2 - 100) */ |
| 114 | ok = rsa_check_pminusq_diff(tmp, rsa->p, rsa->q, nbits); |
| 115 | if (ok < 0) |
| 116 | goto err; |
| 117 | if (ok == 0) |
| 118 | continue; |
| 119 | break; /* successfully finished */ |
| 120 | } |
| 121 | rsa->dirty_cnt++; |
| 122 | ret = 1; |
| 123 | err: |
| 124 | /* Zeroize any internally generated values that are not returned */ |
| 125 | if (Xpo != Xpout) |
| 126 | BN_clear(Xpo); |
| 127 | if (Xqo != Xqout) |
| 128 | BN_clear(Xqo); |
| 129 | BN_clear(tmp); |
| 130 | |
| 131 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 132 | return ret; |
| 133 | } |
| 134 | |
| 135 | /* |
| 136 | * Validates the RSA key size based on the target strength. |
| 137 | * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1.1 (Steps 1a-1b) |
| 138 | * |
| 139 | * Params: |
| 140 | * nbits The key size in bits. |
| 141 | * strength The target strength in bits. -1 means the target |
| 142 | * strength is unknown. |
| 143 | * Returns: 1 if the key size matches the target strength, or 0 otherwise. |
| 144 | */ |
| 145 | int rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(int nbits, int strength) |
| 146 | { |
| 147 | int s = (int)rsa_compute_security_bits(nbits); |
| 148 | |
| 149 | if (s < RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_STRENGTH |
| 150 | || s > RSA_FIPS1864_MAX_KEYGEN_STRENGTH) { |
| 151 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_VALIDATE_STRENGTH, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS); |
| 152 | return 0; |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | if (strength != -1 && s != strength) { |
| 155 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_VALIDATE_STRENGTH, RSA_R_INVALID_STRENGTH); |
| 156 | return 0; |
| 157 | } |
| 158 | return 1; |
| 159 | } |
| 160 | |
| 161 | /* |
| 162 | * |
| 163 | * Using p & q, calculate other required parameters such as n, d. |
| 164 | * as well as the CRT parameters dP, dQ, qInv. |
| 165 | * |
| 166 | * See SP800-56Br1 |
| 167 | * 6.3.1.1 rsakpg1 - basic (Steps 3-4) |
| 168 | * 6.3.1.3 rsakpg1 - crt (Step 5) |
| 169 | * |
| 170 | * Params: |
| 171 | * rsa An rsa object. |
| 172 | * nbits The key size. |
| 173 | * e The public exponent. |
| 174 | * ctx A BN_CTX object. |
| 175 | * Notes: |
| 176 | * There is a small chance that the generated d will be too small. |
| 177 | * Returns: -1 = error, |
| 178 | * 0 = d is too small, |
| 179 | * 1 = success. |
| 180 | */ |
| 181 | int rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(RSA *rsa, int nbits, |
| 182 | const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| 183 | { |
| 184 | int ret = -1; |
| 185 | BIGNUM *p1, *q1, *lcm, *p1q1, *gcd; |
| 186 | |
| 187 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 188 | p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 189 | q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 190 | lcm = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 191 | p1q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 192 | gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 193 | if (gcd == NULL) |
| 194 | goto err; |
| 195 | |
| 196 | /* LCM((p-1, q-1)) */ |
| 197 | if (rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1) != 1) |
| 198 | goto err; |
| 199 | |
| 200 | /* copy e */ |
| 201 | BN_free(rsa->e); |
| 202 | rsa->e = BN_dup(e); |
| 203 | if (rsa->e == NULL) |
| 204 | goto err; |
| 205 | |
| 206 | BN_clear_free(rsa->d); |
| 207 | /* (Step 3) d = (e^-1) mod (LCM(p-1, q-1)) */ |
| 208 | rsa->d = BN_secure_new(); |
| 209 | if (rsa->d == NULL || BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, e, lcm, ctx) == NULL) |
| 210 | goto err; |
| 211 | |
| 212 | /* (Step 3) return an error if d is too small */ |
| 213 | if (BN_num_bits(rsa->d) <= (nbits >> 1)) { |
| 214 | ret = 0; |
| 215 | goto err; |
| 216 | } |
| 217 | |
| 218 | /* (Step 4) n = pq */ |
| 219 | if (rsa->n == NULL) |
| 220 | rsa->n = BN_new(); |
| 221 | if (rsa->n == NULL || !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) |
| 222 | goto err; |
| 223 | |
| 224 | /* (Step 5a) dP = d mod (p-1) */ |
| 225 | if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) |
| 226 | rsa->dmp1 = BN_new(); |
| 227 | if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL || !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, p1, ctx)) |
| 228 | goto err; |
| 229 | |
| 230 | /* (Step 5b) dQ = d mod (q-1) */ |
| 231 | if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) |
| 232 | rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new(); |
| 233 | if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, q1, ctx)) |
| 234 | goto err; |
| 235 | |
| 236 | /* (Step 5c) qInv = (inverse of q) mod p */ |
| 237 | BN_free(rsa->iqmp); |
| 238 | rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new(); |
| 239 | if (rsa->iqmp == NULL |
| 240 | || BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx) == NULL) |
| 241 | goto err; |
| 242 | |
| 243 | rsa->dirty_cnt++; |
| 244 | ret = 1; |
| 245 | err: |
| 246 | if (ret != 1) { |
| 247 | BN_free(rsa->e); |
| 248 | rsa->e = NULL; |
| 249 | BN_free(rsa->d); |
| 250 | rsa->d = NULL; |
| 251 | BN_free(rsa->n); |
| 252 | rsa->n = NULL; |
| 253 | BN_free(rsa->iqmp); |
| 254 | rsa->iqmp = NULL; |
| 255 | BN_free(rsa->dmq1); |
| 256 | rsa->dmq1 = NULL; |
| 257 | BN_free(rsa->dmp1); |
| 258 | rsa->dmp1 = NULL; |
| 259 | } |
| 260 | BN_clear(p1); |
| 261 | BN_clear(q1); |
| 262 | BN_clear(lcm); |
| 263 | BN_clear(p1q1); |
| 264 | BN_clear(gcd); |
| 265 | |
| 266 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 267 | return ret; |
| 268 | } |
| 269 | |
| 270 | /* |
| 271 | * Generate a SP800-56B RSA key. |
| 272 | * |
| 273 | * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1 "RSA Key-Pair Generation with a Fixed Public Exponent" |
| 274 | * 6.3.1.1 rsakpg1 - basic |
| 275 | * 6.3.1.3 rsakpg1 - crt |
| 276 | * |
| 277 | * See also FIPS 186-4 Section B.3.6 |
| 278 | * "Generation of Probable Primes with Conditions Based on Auxiliary |
| 279 | * Probable Primes." |
| 280 | * |
| 281 | * Params: |
| 282 | * rsa The rsa object. |
| 283 | * nbits The intended key size in bits. |
| 284 | * efixed The public exponent. If NULL a default of 65537 is used. |
| 285 | * cb An optional BIGNUM callback. |
| 286 | * Returns: 1 if successfully generated otherwise it returns 0. |
| 287 | */ |
| 288 | int rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(RSA *rsa, int nbits, const BIGNUM *efixed, |
| 289 | BN_GENCB *cb) |
| 290 | { |
| 291 | int ret = 0; |
| 292 | int ok; |
| 293 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 294 | BIGNUM *e = NULL; |
| 295 | |
| 296 | /* (Steps 1a-1b) : Currently ignores the strength check */ |
| 297 | if (!rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, -1)) |
| 298 | return 0; |
| 299 | |
| 300 | ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 301 | if (ctx == NULL) |
| 302 | return 0; |
| 303 | |
| 304 | /* Set default if e is not passed in */ |
| 305 | if (efixed == NULL) { |
| 306 | e = BN_new(); |
| 307 | if (e == NULL || !BN_set_word(e, 65537)) |
| 308 | goto err; |
| 309 | } else { |
| 310 | e = (BIGNUM *)efixed; |
| 311 | } |
| 312 | /* (Step 1c) fixed exponent is checked later . */ |
| 313 | |
| 314 | for (;;) { |
| 315 | /* (Step 2) Generate prime factors */ |
| 316 | if (!rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, |
| 317 | NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, |
| 318 | NULL, nbits, e, ctx, cb)) |
| 319 | goto err; |
| 320 | /* (Steps 3-5) Compute params d, n, dP, dQ, qInv */ |
| 321 | ok = rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa, nbits, e, ctx); |
| 322 | if (ok < 0) |
| 323 | goto err; |
| 324 | if (ok > 0) |
| 325 | break; |
| 326 | /* Gets here if computed d is too small - so try again */ |
| 327 | } |
| 328 | |
| 329 | /* (Step 6) Do pairwise test - optional validity test has been omitted */ |
| 330 | ret = rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test(rsa, ctx); |
| 331 | err: |
| 332 | if (efixed == NULL) |
| 333 | BN_free(e); |
| 334 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 335 | return ret; |
| 336 | } |
| 337 | |
| 338 | /* |
| 339 | * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1.3 (Step 6) Perform a pair-wise consistency test by |
| 340 | * verifying that: k = (k^e)^d mod n for some integer k where 1 < k < n-1. |
| 341 | * |
| 342 | * Returns 1 if the RSA key passes the pairwise test or 0 it it fails. |
| 343 | */ |
| 344 | int rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| 345 | { |
| 346 | int ret = 0; |
| 347 | BIGNUM *k, *tmp; |
| 348 | |
| 349 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 350 | tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 351 | k = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 352 | if (k == NULL) |
| 353 | goto err; |
| 354 | |
| 355 | ret = (BN_set_word(k, 2) |
| 356 | && BN_mod_exp(tmp, k, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx) |
| 357 | && BN_mod_exp(tmp, tmp, rsa->d, rsa->n, ctx) |
| 358 | && BN_cmp(k, tmp) == 0); |
| 359 | if (ret == 0) |
| 360 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_PAIRWISE_TEST, RSA_R_PAIRWISE_TEST_FAILURE); |
| 361 | err: |
| 362 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 363 | return ret; |
| 364 | } |
| 365 | |