| 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #ifndef OSSL_CRYPTO_RAND_LOCAL_H |
| 11 | # define OSSL_CRYPTO_RAND_LOCAL_H |
| 12 | |
| 13 | # include <openssl/aes.h> |
| 14 | # include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 15 | # include <openssl/sha.h> |
| 16 | # include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| 17 | # include <openssl/ec.h> |
| 18 | # include <openssl/rand_drbg.h> |
| 19 | # include "internal/tsan_assist.h" |
| 20 | # include "crypto/rand.h" |
| 21 | |
| 22 | # include "internal/numbers.h" |
| 23 | |
| 24 | /* How many times to read the TSC as a randomness source. */ |
| 25 | # define TSC_READ_COUNT 4 |
| 26 | |
| 27 | /* Maximum reseed intervals */ |
| 28 | # define MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL (1 << 24) |
| 29 | # define MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (1 << 20) /* approx. 12 days */ |
| 30 | |
| 31 | /* Default reseed intervals */ |
| 32 | # define MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL (1 << 8) |
| 33 | # define SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL (1 << 16) |
| 34 | # define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (60*60) /* 1 hour */ |
| 35 | # define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (7*60) /* 7 minutes */ |
| 36 | |
| 37 | /* |
| 38 | * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect |
| 39 | * to the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests. The size is somewhat |
| 40 | * arbitrary, the smaller the value, the less entropy is consumed on first |
| 41 | * read but the higher the probability of the test failing by accident. |
| 42 | * |
| 43 | * The value is in bytes. |
| 44 | */ |
| 45 | #define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16 |
| 46 | |
| 47 | /* |
| 48 | * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string) |
| 49 | * |
| 50 | * NIST SP800 90Ar1 allows a maximum of (1 << 35) bits i.e., (1 << 32) bytes. |
| 51 | * |
| 52 | * We lower it to 'only' INT32_MAX bytes, which is equivalent to 2 gigabytes. |
| 53 | */ |
| 54 | # define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH INT32_MAX |
| 55 | |
| 56 | /* The default nonce */ |
| 57 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
| 58 | # define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING { 0x4f, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x53, 0x53, \ |
| 59 | 0x4c, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x49, 0x53, 0x54, 0x20, 0x53, 0x50, 0x20, 0x38, 0x30, \ |
| 60 | 0x30, 0x2d, 0x39, 0x30, 0x41, 0x20, 0x44, 0x52, 0x42, 0x47, 0x00}; |
| 61 | #else |
| 62 | # define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG" |
| 63 | #endif |
| 64 | |
| 65 | /* |
| 66 | * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers |
| 67 | * |
| 68 | * The max_len value for the buffer provided to the rand_drbg_get_entropy() |
| 69 | * callback is currently 2^31 bytes (2 gigabytes), if a derivation function |
| 70 | * is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the rand_pool_new() |
| 71 | * function chooses more modest values as default pool length, bounded |
| 72 | * by RAND_POOL_MIN_LENGTH and RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH |
| 73 | * |
| 74 | * The choice of the RAND_POOL_FACTOR is large enough such that the |
| 75 | * RAND_POOL can store a random input which has a lousy entropy rate of |
| 76 | * 8/256 (= 0.03125) bits per byte. This input will be sent through the |
| 77 | * derivation function which 'compresses' the low quality input into a |
| 78 | * high quality output. |
| 79 | * |
| 80 | * The factor 1.5 below is the pessimistic estimate for the extra amount |
| 81 | * of entropy required when no get_nonce() callback is defined. |
| 82 | */ |
| 83 | # define RAND_POOL_FACTOR 256 |
| 84 | # define RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \ |
| 85 | 3 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 16)) |
| 86 | /* |
| 87 | * = (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \ |
| 88 | * 1.5 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8)) |
| 89 | */ |
| 90 | |
| 91 | /* |
| 92 | * Initial allocation minimum. |
| 93 | * |
| 94 | * There is a distinction between the secure and normal allocation minimums. |
| 95 | * Ideally, the secure allocation size should be a power of two. The normal |
| 96 | * allocation size doesn't have any such restriction. |
| 97 | * |
| 98 | * The secure value is based on 128 bits of secure material, which is 16 bytes. |
| 99 | * Typically, the DRBGs will set a minimum larger than this so optimal |
| 100 | * allocation ought to take place (for full quality seed material). |
| 101 | * |
| 102 | * The normal value has been chosed by noticing that the rand_drbg_get_nonce |
| 103 | * function is usually the largest of the built in allocation (twenty four |
| 104 | * bytes and then appending another sixteen bytes). This means the buffer ends |
| 105 | * with 40 bytes. The value of forty eight is comfortably above this which |
| 106 | * allows some slack in the platform specific values used. |
| 107 | */ |
| 108 | # define RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure) ((secure) ? 16 : 48) |
| 109 | |
| 110 | /* DRBG status values */ |
| 111 | typedef enum drbg_status_e { |
| 112 | DRBG_UNINITIALISED, |
| 113 | DRBG_READY, |
| 114 | DRBG_ERROR |
| 115 | } DRBG_STATUS; |
| 116 | |
| 117 | |
| 118 | /* instantiate */ |
| 119 | typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_instantiate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, |
| 120 | const unsigned char *ent, |
| 121 | size_t entlen, |
| 122 | const unsigned char *nonce, |
| 123 | size_t noncelen, |
| 124 | const unsigned char *pers, |
| 125 | size_t perslen); |
| 126 | /* reseed */ |
| 127 | typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_reseed_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, |
| 128 | const unsigned char *ent, |
| 129 | size_t entlen, |
| 130 | const unsigned char *adin, |
| 131 | size_t adinlen); |
| 132 | /* generate output */ |
| 133 | typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_generate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, |
| 134 | unsigned char *out, |
| 135 | size_t outlen, |
| 136 | const unsigned char *adin, |
| 137 | size_t adinlen); |
| 138 | /* uninstantiate */ |
| 139 | typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx); |
| 140 | |
| 141 | |
| 142 | /* |
| 143 | * The DRBG methods |
| 144 | */ |
| 145 | |
| 146 | typedef struct rand_drbg_method_st { |
| 147 | RAND_DRBG_instantiate_fn instantiate; |
| 148 | RAND_DRBG_reseed_fn reseed; |
| 149 | RAND_DRBG_generate_fn generate; |
| 150 | RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate_fn uninstantiate; |
| 151 | } RAND_DRBG_METHOD; |
| 152 | |
| 153 | /* 888 bits from SP800-90Ar1 10.1 table 2 */ |
| 154 | #define HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN (888/8) |
| 155 | |
| 156 | typedef struct rand_drbg_hash_st { |
| 157 | EVP_MD *md; |
| 158 | EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; |
| 159 | size_t blocklen; |
| 160 | unsigned char V[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN]; |
| 161 | unsigned char C[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN]; |
| 162 | /* Temporary value storage: should always exceed max digest length */ |
| 163 | unsigned char vtmp[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN]; |
| 164 | } RAND_DRBG_HASH; |
| 165 | |
| 166 | typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st { |
| 167 | EVP_MD *md; |
| 168 | HMAC_CTX *ctx; |
| 169 | size_t blocklen; |
| 170 | unsigned char K[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 171 | unsigned char V[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 172 | } RAND_DRBG_HMAC; |
| 173 | |
| 174 | /* |
| 175 | * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR. |
| 176 | */ |
| 177 | typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st { |
| 178 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; |
| 179 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df; |
| 180 | EVP_CIPHER *cipher; |
| 181 | size_t keylen; |
| 182 | unsigned char K[32]; |
| 183 | unsigned char V[16]; |
| 184 | /* Temporary block storage used by ctr_df */ |
| 185 | unsigned char bltmp[16]; |
| 186 | size_t bltmp_pos; |
| 187 | unsigned char KX[48]; |
| 188 | } RAND_DRBG_CTR; |
| 189 | |
| 190 | |
| 191 | /* |
| 192 | * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random |
| 193 | * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about |
| 194 | * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add() |
| 195 | * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the |
| 196 | * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and |
| 197 | * 4) cleanup the random pool again. |
| 198 | * |
| 199 | * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and |
| 200 | * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame. |
| 201 | */ |
| 202 | struct rand_pool_st { |
| 203 | unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */ |
| 204 | size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */ |
| 205 | |
| 206 | int attached; /* true pool was attached to existing buffer */ |
| 207 | int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */ |
| 208 | |
| 209 | size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */ |
| 210 | size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */ |
| 211 | size_t alloc_len; /* current number of bytes allocated */ |
| 212 | size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */ |
| 213 | size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */ |
| 214 | }; |
| 215 | |
| 216 | /* |
| 217 | * The state of all types of DRBGs, even though we only have CTR mode |
| 218 | * right now. |
| 219 | */ |
| 220 | struct rand_drbg_st { |
| 221 | CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; |
| 222 | /* The library context this DRBG is associated with, if any */ |
| 223 | OPENSSL_CTX *libctx; |
| 224 | RAND_DRBG *parent; |
| 225 | int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */ |
| 226 | int type; /* the nid of the underlying algorithm */ |
| 227 | /* |
| 228 | * Stores the return value of openssl_get_fork_id() as of when we last |
| 229 | * reseeded. The DRBG reseeds automatically whenever drbg->fork_id != |
| 230 | * openssl_get_fork_id(). Used to provide fork-safety and reseed this |
| 231 | * DRBG in the child process. |
| 232 | */ |
| 233 | int fork_id; |
| 234 | unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */ |
| 235 | |
| 236 | /* |
| 237 | * The random_data is used by RAND_add()/drbg_add() to attach random |
| 238 | * data to the global drbg, such that the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback |
| 239 | * can pull it during instantiation and reseeding. This is necessary to |
| 240 | * reconcile the different philosophies of the RAND and the RAND_DRBG |
| 241 | * with respect to how randomness is added to the RNG during reseeding |
| 242 | * (see PR #4328). |
| 243 | */ |
| 244 | struct rand_pool_st *seed_pool; |
| 245 | |
| 246 | /* |
| 247 | * Auxiliary pool for additional data. |
| 248 | */ |
| 249 | struct rand_pool_st *adin_pool; |
| 250 | |
| 251 | /* |
| 252 | * The following parameters are setup by the per-type "init" function. |
| 253 | * |
| 254 | * The supported types and their init functions are: |
| 255 | * (1) CTR_DRBG: drbg_ctr_init(). |
| 256 | * (2) HMAC_DRBG: drbg_hmac_init(). |
| 257 | * (3) HASH_DRBG: drbg_hash_init(). |
| 258 | * |
| 259 | * The parameters are closely related to the ones described in |
| 260 | * section '10.2.1 CTR_DRBG' of [NIST SP 800-90Ar1], with one |
| 261 | * crucial difference: In the NIST standard, all counts are given |
| 262 | * in bits, whereas in OpenSSL entropy counts are given in bits |
| 263 | * and buffer lengths are given in bytes. |
| 264 | * |
| 265 | * Since this difference has lead to some confusion in the past, |
| 266 | * (see [GitHub Issue #2443], formerly [rt.openssl.org #4055]) |
| 267 | * the 'len' suffix has been added to all buffer sizes for |
| 268 | * clarification. |
| 269 | */ |
| 270 | |
| 271 | int strength; |
| 272 | size_t max_request; |
| 273 | size_t min_entropylen, max_entropylen; |
| 274 | size_t min_noncelen, max_noncelen; |
| 275 | size_t max_perslen, max_adinlen; |
| 276 | |
| 277 | /* |
| 278 | * Counts the number of generate requests since the last reseed |
| 279 | * (Starts at 1). This value is the reseed_counter as defined in |
| 280 | * NIST SP 800-90Ar1 |
| 281 | */ |
| 282 | unsigned int reseed_gen_counter; |
| 283 | /* |
| 284 | * Maximum number of generate requests until a reseed is required. |
| 285 | * This value is ignored if it is zero. |
| 286 | */ |
| 287 | unsigned int reseed_interval; |
| 288 | /* Stores the time when the last reseeding occurred */ |
| 289 | time_t reseed_time; |
| 290 | /* |
| 291 | * Specifies the maximum time interval (in seconds) between reseeds. |
| 292 | * This value is ignored if it is zero. |
| 293 | */ |
| 294 | time_t reseed_time_interval; |
| 295 | /* |
| 296 | * Counts the number of reseeds since instantiation. |
| 297 | * This value is ignored if it is zero. |
| 298 | * |
| 299 | * This counter is used only for seed propagation from the <master> DRBG |
| 300 | * to its two children, the <public> and <private> DRBG. This feature is |
| 301 | * very special and its sole purpose is to ensure that any randomness which |
| 302 | * is added by RAND_add() or RAND_seed() will have an immediate effect on |
| 303 | * the output of RAND_bytes() resp. RAND_priv_bytes(). |
| 304 | */ |
| 305 | TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_prop_counter; |
| 306 | unsigned int reseed_next_counter; |
| 307 | |
| 308 | size_t seedlen; |
| 309 | DRBG_STATUS state; |
| 310 | |
| 311 | /* Application data, mainly used in the KATs. */ |
| 312 | CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; |
| 313 | |
| 314 | /* Implementation specific data */ |
| 315 | union { |
| 316 | RAND_DRBG_CTR ctr; |
| 317 | RAND_DRBG_HASH hash; |
| 318 | RAND_DRBG_HMAC hmac; |
| 319 | } data; |
| 320 | |
| 321 | /* Implementation specific methods */ |
| 322 | RAND_DRBG_METHOD *meth; |
| 323 | |
| 324 | /* Callback functions. See comments in rand_lib.c */ |
| 325 | RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy; |
| 326 | RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy; |
| 327 | RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce; |
| 328 | RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce; |
| 329 | }; |
| 330 | |
| 331 | /* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */ |
| 332 | extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth; |
| 333 | |
| 334 | /* DRBG helpers */ |
| 335 | int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
| 336 | const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy); |
| 337 | size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg); |
| 338 | /* locking api */ |
| 339 | int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg); |
| 340 | int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg); |
| 341 | int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg); |
| 342 | |
| 343 | |
| 344 | /* initializes the DRBG implementation */ |
| 345 | int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg); |
| 346 | int drbg_hash_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg); |
| 347 | int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg); |
| 348 | |
| 349 | /* |
| 350 | * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests. |
| 351 | * These need to be exposed for the unit tests. |
| 352 | */ |
| 353 | int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool, |
| 354 | unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md, |
| 355 | unsigned int *md_size); |
| 356 | extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool, |
| 357 | unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md, |
| 358 | unsigned int *md_size); |
| 359 | |
| 360 | #endif |
| 361 | |